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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wall Street has achieved a remarkable political comeback from 
the financial crisis of 2007–2009.  Public anger over bailouts of 
large financial institutions spurred Congress to pass the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank) in July 2010.1  Megabanks, however, used their political 
influence to weaken Dodd-Frank’s provisions,2 and they have 
pursued a determined campaign since 2010 to undermine Dodd-
Frank’s implementation.3   
A primary goal of Dodd-Frank is to end “too big to fail” (TBTF) 
treatment for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) 
and their creditors.4  During the debates over Dodd-Frank, 
however, Wall Street defeated two major initiatives that would 
have threatened megabanks’ TBTF status.  First, Wall Street’s 
political allies voted down a proposed amendment by Senators 
Sherrod Brown and Ted Kaufman, which would have forced a 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].  For discussions of high-risk activities by large 
financial firms that precipitated the financial crisis, as well as the federal government’s 
bailouts of financial giants and the public anger that followed, see generally ALAN S. BLINDER, 
AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 
(2013); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to 
the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 957–84, 1026–28 (2011) [hereinafter 
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington 
Keeps Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1290–93, 1345–66 (2013) [hereinafter 
Wilmarth, Blind Eye]; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation Is Needed 
to Preserve the Viability of Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks, 2015 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 249, 256–76 [hereinafter Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System]. 
 2 See, e.g., Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1029–34 (describing the financial 
industry’s success in weakening the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment prior to 
Dodd-Frank’s passage). 
 3 See Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1296–1312 (describing the financial industry’s 
lobbying and litigation that undermined Dodd-Frank’s implementation between July 2010 and 
mid-2013); Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 323–32 (discussing the financial 
industry’s continued campaign to obstruct Dodd-Frank’s implementation between mid-2013 
and the end of 2014); Adam Davidson, Wall Street Is Using the Power of Dodd-Frank Against 
Itself, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 27, 2015, http:// www.nytimes.com/2015/05/31/magazine/wall-str 
eet-is-using-the-power-of-dodd-frank-itself.html (describing lobbying and litigation and a 
“myriad [of] other ways” in which Wall Street has worked “to change the letter of [Dodd-
Frank] so as to alter its spirit”). 
 4 Dodd-Frank, 124 Stat. at 1376 (preamble). 
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breakup of the six largest U.S. banks.5  Second, Wall Street’s allies 
blocked proposals that would have required the largest financial 
institutions to pay risk-based premiums to prefund the Orderly 
Liquidation Fund (OLF).6  As discussed below, the OLF provides 
funding for resolving failed SIFIs under Title II of Dodd-Frank.7  
Due to Wall Street’s success in defeating the prefunding proposals, 
the OLF currently has a zero balance and must rely on borrowings 
from the Treasury Department (Treasury) and, ultimately, 
taxpayers.8   
Large financial conglomerates (frequently called “universal 
banks”) are determined to defend their current business model, 
which relies on government protection of depositors and “shadow 
banking” creditors to ensure low-cost funding for their speculative 
capital markets activities.9  In December 2014, Wall Street’s 
congressional allies succeeded in repealing the Lincoln 
Amendment, which was enacted as Section 716 of Dodd-Frank.10  
The Lincoln Amendment would have forced megabanks to incur 
significant additional costs by transferring many of their 
derivatives from their federally-insured bank subsidiaries to 
nonbank affiliates.11  Wall Street’s determined campaign to repeal 
the Lincoln Amendment “provides compelling evidence that Wall 
Street’s business model depends on the ability of large financial 
                                                                                                                   
 5 See, e.g., Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1055 n.454 (discussing the defeat of 
the Brown-Kaufman amendment, which would have imposed maximum size limits on large 
financial institutions); Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1366.  
 6 See Arthur Wilmarth, Use Tiered Regulation to Preserve Small Banks, Keep Big Ones in 
Line, AM. BANKER, Apr. 2, 2015, http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/use-tiered-regula 
tion-to-protect-small-banks-keep-big-ones-in-line-1073578-1.html (discussing how Wall Street 
and its allies successfully defeated proposals to prefund the OLF). 
 7 See infra notes 92–101 and accompanying text (discussing the OLF). 
 8 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 999, 1015–18. 
 9 See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.1 (describing how universal banks use government-
subsidized funding to support their capital markets activities); see also infra note 165 and 
accompanying text (discussing the determination of top executives of global megabanks to 
maintain the universal banking model); Zoltan Pozsar et al., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., 
STAFF REPORT NO. 458, SHADOW BANKING 22–33, 46–64 (2010), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1645337 (describing how the “shadow banking” system provides “shadow 
bank deposits” to finance the activities of U.S. and foreign megabanks and how federal 
agencies protected shadow banking creditors during the financial crisis).  
 10 See Wilmarth, supra note 6. 
 11 Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 329–32. 
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conglomerates to keep exploiting the cheap funding provided by 
their ‘too big to fail’ subsidies . . . .”12 
This Article focuses on a key strategy adopted by Wall Street to 
preserve the universal banking model and its TBTF privileges.  
The financial industry has promoted the “single point of entry” 
(SPOE) plan for resolving failures of SIFIs under Title II of Dodd-
Frank.13  That plan has attracted the support of U.S. and foreign 
regulators.14  As shown below, Wall Street’s SPOE plan would 
ensure future bailouts for SIFIs and their short-term creditors 
while imposing the costs of those bailouts on ordinary investors 
and taxpayers.15   
Title II of Dodd-Frank establishes the Orderly Liquidation 
Authority (OLA) to resolve failures of SIFIs.16  Under the OLA, the 
Treasury Secretary may appoint the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) as receiver for a failing financial company if 
the failure of that company would have “serious adverse effects on 
financial stability,” and if “no viable private sector alternative is 
available to prevent” the company’s collapse.17  Title II requires 
the FDIC to liquidate a failed SIFI while imposing losses on its 
shareholders and creditors.18  Title II’s liquidation-only mandate 
threatens the TBTF subsidy for SIFIs,19 and it therefore presents a 
                                                                                                                   
 12 Rob Blackwell, Why Citi May Soon Regret Its Big Victory on Capitol Hill, AM. BANKER, 
Dec. 11, 2014, http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/why-citi-may-soon-regr 
et-its-big-victory-on-capitol-hill-1071636-1.html (quoting my description of Wall Street’s 
motivation for repealing Section 716 of Dodd-Frank). 
 13 See Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chair, FDIC, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago Bank Structure Conference (May 10, 2012), available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/ 
news/speeches/archives/2012/spmay1012.html (describing SPOE as “the most promising 
resolution strategy” for dealing with the failure of a global SIFI). 
 14 E.g., FDIC & THE BANK OF ENGLAND, RESOLVING GLOBALLY ACTIVE, SYSTEMICALLY 
IMPORTANT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2012), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
publications/Documents/news/2012/nr156.pdf. 
 15 See infra Part II.C (describing how SPOE would ensure future bailouts for Wall Street 
creditors and impose losses on ordinary investors and taxpayers). 
 16 See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 204(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1454 (2010) (describing 
the purpose of the OLF). 
 17 Dodd-Frank §§ 202(a), 203(b). 
 18 See infra notes 23–28 and accompanying text (discussing Title II’s liquidation-only 
mandate). 
 19 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2 (2010). 
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direct challenge to the universal banking model.  To meet that 
challenge, Wall Street embraced the SPOE resolution approach. 
As explained in Part II of this Article, the FDIC’s early 
rulemakings under Title II indicated that the FDIC would comply 
with OLA’s liquidation-only mandate by breaking up failed SIFIs 
through structured asset sales.  The financial industry, however, 
responded by advocating the SPOE plan, which would place only 
the parent holding company of a failed SIFI in receivership while 
maintaining its operating subsidiaries as going concerns.  Short-
term creditors of the holding company and all creditors of the 
operating subsidiaries would be fully protected.  The protected 
creditors would include uninsured depositors and shadow banking 
creditors with close connections to Wall Street.  
The financial industry’s SPOE plan relies on a two-part funding 
strategy to guarantee continued protection for Wall Street.  First, 
the parent holding company of each SIFI would issue long-term 
“bail-in” bonds.  The FDIC would convert bail-in bonds into equity 
when a SIFI fails, thereby imposing losses on bail-in bondholders 
as well as shareholders.  SIFIs would market and sell bail-in bonds 
to non-systemic investors, including mutual funds and pension 
funds that invest the savings of ordinary individuals.  
Second, if write-offs of bail-in bonds are not sufficient to 
recapitalize a failed SIFI and its operating subsidiaries, SPOE 
would use the OLF’s authority to borrow from Treasury.  OLF 
loans—which are ultimately backstopped by taxpayers—would 
support the failed SIFI’s operating subsidiaries and provide full 
protection to short-term creditors of the parent holding company 
and all creditors of the operating subsidiaries.  At the end of the 
OLA process, a new, cleaned-up SIFI would emerge that closely 
resembles the failed SIFI, except for the losses imposed on the 
failed SIFI’s shareholders and bail-in bondholders.  Thus, contrary 
to Title II’s explicit mandate, SPOE would reorganize, rather than 
liquidate, failed SIFIs and would also guarantee bailouts for Wall 
Street creditors while imposing the costs of those bailouts on 
ordinary investors and taxpayers.   
Supporters contend that SPOE could provide significant 
benefits by maintaining the operating subsidiaries of a failed SIFI 
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as going concerns and by facilitating cross-border cooperation 
among domestic and foreign regulators when a global SIFI fails.  It 
is highly doubtful, however, whether those assumed advantages 
would be realized in fact.  Moreover, SPOE’s alleged benefits do 
not justify giving blanket protection to Wall Street creditors at the 
expense of ordinary investors and taxpayers.   
Although U.S. and foreign regulators have not yet formally 
adopted SPOE, it appears very likely that they will do so.  Given 
that reality, Part III of this Article proposes two reforms to reduce 
the TBTF subsidy inherent in SPOE.  First, SIFIs should pay risk-
adjusted premiums to prefund the OLF at a level of $300 billion or 
more.  The prefunded OLF should be used to cover the costs of 
resolving a failed SIFI after the FDIC has written off investments 
by shareholders, holders of subordinated debt, and qualifying 
holders of bail-in bonds.20  Prefunding the OLF would help to 
protect taxpayers from bearing the costs of resolving failed SIFIs.  
In addition, risk-adjusted OLF premiums would (1) force SIFIs to 
internalize at least some of the systemic risks they create and (2) 
encourage SIFIs to follow more prudent operating strategies and 
adopt less complex business structures.   
As part of their OLF premiums, SIFIs should pay special fees 
on their uninsured deposits and shadow banking liabilities.  Under 
SPOE, those deposits and liabilities would receive full protection 
and would enjoy a status similar to insured deposits.  The required 
fees should be comparable to risk-based deposit insurance 
premiums and should encourage SIFIs to establish more stable, 
longer-term funding structures. 
Second, SIFIs should pay at least half of their compensation to 
senior executives and other key employees in the form of 
contingent convertible bonds (CoCos), a type of bail-in debt.  
Insiders should be required to hold their CoCos, without any 
                                                                                                                   
 20 To prevent SIFIs from misleading ordinary investors, this Article proposes that SIFIs 
should be barred from selling bail-in bonds to ordinary individuals, retail mutual funds, or 
pension funds unless those bonds are explicitly described and marketed as “subordinated 
debt” that is junior to all general creditor claims.  More complex forms of bail-in bonds should 
be sold only to sophisticated, wealthy individuals and asset managers who do not control funds 
invested by ordinary individuals.  See infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
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hedging, for a significant period of time after their employment 
ends.  CoCos would expose insiders to immediate losses if their 
SIFIs were to fail during their employment or during their post-
employment holding period.  CoCos would encourage insiders of 
SIFIs to forgo speculative ventures and adopt sustainable, long-
term business strategies that are more closely aligned with the 
interests of long-term creditors, the FDIC, and taxpayers. 
II.  SPOE WOULD PRESERVE TBTF TREATMENT FOR SIFIS AND 
WALL STREET CREDITORS WHILE IMPOSING LOSSES ON ORDINARY 
INVESTORS AND TAXPAYERS 
A.  IN ITS EARLY RULEMAKINGS UNDER TITLE II, FDIC RECOGNIZED 
DODD-FRANK’S LIQUIDATION-ONLY MANDATE 
Title II of Dodd-Frank establishes the OLA to provide an 
orderly process for resolving failed SIFIs.  Congress intended that 
the OLA would provide a “viable alternative” to a “bailout . . . that 
would expose taxpayers to losses and undermine market 
discipline.”21  Title II’s blueprint for resolving failed SIFIs is 
similar to the FDIC’s resolution regime for failed depository 
institutions.22   
Title II requires that a financial company placed in an OLA 
receivership must be liquidated and any losses from the 
liquidation must be imposed on the company’s shareholders and 
                                                                                                                   
 21 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010). 
 22 See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW 
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 485–523 (5th ed. 2013) (describing the FDIC’s resolution 
regime for failed banks); see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Certain 
Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,173, 64,175 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter FDIC Proposed OLA Rule] (“Parties who are 
familiar with the liquidation of insured depository institutions under the [Federal Deposit 
Insurance] Act . . . will recognize many parallel provisions in Title II.”); Orderly Liquidation 
Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4209 (Jan. 25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) [hereinafter 
FDIC Interim OLA Rule] (restating the premise from the FDIC Proposed OLA Rule 
regarding “parallel provisions in Title II”). 
2015]      WALL STREET BAILOUTS  51 
 
 
creditors.23  Section 214(a) declares that “[a]ll financial companies 
put into receivership under [Title II] shall be liquidated,” and “[n]o 
taxpayer funds shall be used to prevent the liquidation of any 
financial company under [Title II].”24  Thus, Dodd-Frank creates a 
liquidation-only mandate, as explained in the Senate committee 
report: 
Once a failing financial company is placed under [an 
OLA receivership], liquidation is the only option; the 
failing financial company may not be kept open or 
rehabilitated.  The financial company’s business 
operations and assets will be sold off or liquidated, the 
culpable management of the company will be 
discharged, shareholders will have their investments 
wiped out, and unsecured creditors and counterparties 
will bear losses.25  
Congress did not want a failed SIFI to emerge from an OLA 
proceeding as a “rehabilitated” SIFI.26  Instead, Congress expected 
that a failed SIFI would be broken up into smaller companies or its 
assets would be sold so that the result of an OLA receivership 
would be a reduced level of systemic risk.27  Title II’s liquidation-
only mandate is a key component of Dodd-Frank’s declared 
purpose “to end ‘too big to fail’ ” and “to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts.”28   
The FDIC recognized the liquidation-only mandate in its early 
rulemakings under Title II.  In late 2010 and early 2011, the FDIC 
issued proposed and interim rules, which affirmed that “a 
liquidation under the Dodd-Frank Act is a liquidation of the 
                                                                                                                   
 23 Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 204(a)(1), 206(2)–(3), 214(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1454, 
1459, 1518 (2010). 
 24 Id. § 214(a). 
 25 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (emphasis added). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 2, 4. 
 28 Dodd-Frank, 124 Stat. at 1376 (preamble); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2 (2010) (to 
accomplish Dodd-Frank’s stated goal of ending TBTF, the statute creates “a mechanism to 
liquidate [SIFIs] should they fail without any losses to the taxpayer”). 
52 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 50:43 
 
 
[financial] company that imposes the losses on its creditors and 
shareholders . . . while ensuring that taxpayers bear none of the 
costs.”29  Both rules stated that the FDIC could establish a bridge 
financial company (BFC) to “continue key operations, services, and 
transactions that will maximize the value of [a failed SIFI’s] assets 
and avoid a disorderly collapse in the market place.”30  However, 
the rules also said that a BFC would be employed only as a 
temporary expedient until the FDIC could arrange an orderly sale 
of the SIFI’s assets to third parties.31  The following statements 
from the rulemakings indicated that the FDIC would use a BFC to 
accomplish, not circumvent, the liquidation-only mandate: 
[T]he FDIC is given broad authority under the Dodd-
Frank Act to operate or liquidate the business, sell the 
assets, and resolve the liabilities of a covered financial 
company immediately after its appointment as 
receiver or as soon as conditions make this 
appropriate.  This authority will enable the FDIC to 
act immediately to sell assets of the covered financial 
company to another entity or, if that is not possible, to 
an FDIC-created bridge financial company while 
maintaining critical functions . . . .  
 . . . Once the new [BFC]’s operations have stabilized 
as the market recognizes that it has adequate funding 
and will continue key operations, the FDIC would 
move as expeditiously as possible to sell operations 
and assets back into the private sector.32  
Thus, the FDIC’s early rulemakings were consistent with Title 
II’s liquidation-only mandate.  The rulemakings did specify that 
                                                                                                                   
 29 FDIC Proposed OLA Rule, supra note 22, at 64,175; FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra 
note 22, at 4209. 
 30 FDIC Proposed OLA Rule, supra note 22, at 64,175; FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra 
note 22, at 4209. 
 31 FDIC Proposed OLA Rule, supra note 22, at 64,175; FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra 
note 22, at 4209. 
 32 FDIC Proposed OLA Rule, supra note 22, at 64,176; FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra 
note 22, at 4210. 
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the FDIC could give preferential treatment to certain short-term 
creditors to preserve crucial operations of failed SIFIs.  In 
contrast, the FDIC stated that it would never provide such 
treatment to holders of debt securities with maturities of more 
than 360 days.33  In response to the FDIC’s early rulemakings, 
many critics argued that the FDIC should not favor the same types 
of short-term Wall Street creditors—including counterparties 
under derivatives and securities repurchase agreements—whose 
reckless behavior contributed to the financial crisis.34  As 
discussed below in Parts II.C.1 and III.A.2, the SPOE plan creates 
similar concerns that the FDIC will give preferential treatment to 
Wall Street creditors when SIFIs fail. 
B.  THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY DEVELOPED SPOE TO EVADE DODD-
FRANK’S LIQUIDATION-ONLY MANDATE AND TO GUARANTEE 
PROTECTION FOR WALL STREET CREDITORS   
During the FDIC’s consideration of its early OLA rules, two 
leading Wall Street trade associations—the Securities Industries 
and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and the Clearing 
House Association (TCH)—developed a very different strategy for 
resolving failed SIFIs.  Wall Street’s strategy—called 
“recapitalization-within-resolution”—provided a roadmap for 
reorganizing failed SIFIs instead of liquidating them.35  In a 
                                                                                                                   
 33 FDIC Proposed OLA Rule, supra note 22, at 64,177–78; FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra 
note 22, at 4211–12.  In July 2011, the FDIC adopted a final rule that reaffirmed its 
intention to provide preferential treatment to short-term creditors while denying similar 
treatment to holders of long-term debt securities.  See Certain Orderly Liquidation 
Authority Provisions Under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626, 41,634, 41,644 (July 15, 2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
380) [hereinafter FDIC Final OLA Rule]. 
 34 FDIC Final OLA Rule, supra note 33, at 41,627, 41,634 (noting that many 
commentators objected to the FDIC’s plan to favor short-term creditors over long-term 
creditors); FDIC Interim OLA Rule, supra note 22, at 4211–12 (noting similar objections by 
commentators to the FDIC’s plan); see also Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 998–99 
(criticizing the FDIC’s plan to provide preferential treatment to short-term creditors 
because it would “encourage SIFIs to rely even more heavily on vulnerable, short-term 
funding strategies that led to repeated disasters during the financial crisis”).  
 35 Randall D. Guynn, Framing the TBTF Problem: The Path to a Solution, in ACROSS THE 
GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 281, 284 n.13 (Martin Neil 
Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014), available at http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/acr 
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comment letter submitted to the FDIC in May 2011, SIFMA and 
TCH argued that “recapitalizations” would be a “more effective” 
approach for resolving a failed SIFI “during a financial panic than 
a liquidation of financial assets or the sale of a troubled or 
insolvent SIFI to a third party.”36   
Wall Street’s strategy provided the conceptual foundation for 
SPOE.37  In a May 2012 speech, FDIC Chair Martin Gruenberg 
described SPOE as “the most promising resolution strategy” for 
dealing with the failure of a global SIFI.38  Mr. Gruenberg 
explained that SPOE would “place the parent [holding] company 
into receivership and . . . pass its assets, principally investments in 
its subsidiaries, to a newly created bridge holding company.  This 
will allow subsidiaries . . . to remain open and avoid the disruption 
that would likely accompany their closings.”39   
In December 2012, the FDIC and the Bank of England (BoE) 
identified SPOE as a desirable approach for resolving failures of 
global SIFIs.  The FDIC and the BoE argued that SPOE would 
work well for global SIFIs because, “[b]y taking control of the SIFI 
at the top of the group, subsidiaries (domestic and foreign) 
carrying out critical services can remain open and operating, 
limiting the need for destabilizing insolvency proceedings at the 
subsidiary level.”40  SPOE could also reduce cross-border 
complications because the primary supervisor of a failed SIFI 
would control the resolution process at the “holding company level” 
while avoiding “foreign insolvency proceedings” for subsidiaries 
located in other countries.41   
                                                                                                                   
oss-the-great-divide-ch13.pdf (stating that Mr. Guynn, a partner and the head of the 
Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk & Wardwell, helped SIFMA and TCH to develop 
their “recapitalization-within-resolution” plan for dealing with failed SIFIs). 
 36 Letter from Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., Exec. Vice President of Pub. Policy & Advocacy, Sec. 
Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, & Mark Zingale, Senior Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, The 
Clearing House Ass’n, to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, FDIC 2 (May 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.sifma.org/ issues/itemaspx?id=25639. 
 37 Guynn, supra note 35, at 284 n.13. 
 38 Gruenberg, supra note 13. 
 39 Id. 
 40 FDIC & THE BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 14, at 6. 
 41 Id. at 11; see also Martin Gruenberg & Paul Tucker, Op-Ed., When Global Banks Fail, 
Resolve Them Globally, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fd66d172-3fd4-
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While endorsing the SPOE concept, the FDIC and the BoE 
indicated that the final outcome of a SPOE resolution would be a 
liquidation of the failed SIFI.  The agencies stated that SPOE’s 
“top-down resolution” would be followed by “significant 
restructuring” that could include “shrinking the [SIFI’s] balance 
sheet, breaking the company up into smaller entities, and/or 
selling or closing certain operations.”42   
In December 2013, the FDIC presented a detailed SPOE 
proposal in a public call for comments.43  Consistent with Wall 
Street’s plan, the FDIC’s proposal would put a failed SIFI’s parent 
holding company into an OLA receivership while transferring its 
operating subsidiaries to a newly-formed BFC.44  The FDIC would 
wipe out the equity interests of the SIFI’s shareholders and 
convert the claims of the SIFI’s long-term bondholders into equity 
interests in the BFC.45  The failed SIFI’s operating subsidiaries 
(including banks, securities broker-dealers, and insurance 
companies) would continue to operate without interruption under 
the BFC’s control, and the rights of creditors of those subsidiaries 
would not be impaired.46   
After completing an SPOE resolution, the FDIC would approve 
a “restructuring” plan to transfer the operating subsidiaries from 
the BFC to one or more successor companies.47  The FDIC 
explained that “restructuring might result in the [BFC] being 
divided into several companies or parts of entities being sold to 
third parties,” and “the [BFC] might become smaller and less 
complex.”48  The FDIC’s repeated use of the word “might” rather 
than “will,” when discussing asset transfers and sales, indicated a 
                                                                                                                   
11e2-b0c3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3rjlxII58 (explaining that, under SPOE, “subsidiaries 
(domestic and foreign) would be kept open and operating, thereby limiting contagion effects 
and cross-border complications”). 
 42 FDIC & THE BANK OF ENGLAND, supra note 14, at 9. 
 43 Notice of Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point 
of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614 (Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter FDIC SPOE Proposal]. 
 44 Id. at 76,616.  
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 76,620. 
 48 Id. (emphasis added). 
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possible weakening of the FDIC’s commitment to a liquidation-
only approach. 
Five leading financial industry trade associations 
enthusiastically endorsed the FDIC’s SPOE proposal.49  The same 
groups rejected criticism of the proposal by former Federal Reserve 
Board Chair Paul Volcker.  Mr. Volcker observed that SPOE 
looked “more like a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code than a liquidation as required by Title II [of 
Dodd-Frank].”50  I and other commentators agreed with Mr. 
Volcker’s view that SPOE did not appear to be consistent with 
Title II’s liquidation-only mandate.51  
The Wall Street trade groups claimed that Title II would permit 
an SPOE strategy that “treats claimants as consistently as 
possible with how they would have been treated in a successful 
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code.”52  In fact, however, as 
                                                                                                                   
 49 See Letter from John Court, Managing Dir. & Senior Assoc. Gen. Counsel, The 
Clearing House et al., to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec’y, FDIC (Feb. 18, 2014) [hereinafter 
2014 Wall Street SPOE Letter], available at https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/media/Fi 
les/Association%20Documents/20140218%20Single%20Point%20of%20Entry%20Comment 
%20Letter.pdf (letter from TCH, SIFMA, the American Bankers Association, the Financial 
Services Roundtable, and the Global Financial Markets Association).  TCH had previously 
issued a report advocating the SPOE strategy.  THE CLEARING HOUSE, ENDING “TOO-BIG-
TO-FAIL”: TITLE II OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE APPROACH OF “SINGLE POINT OF 
ENTRY” PRIVATE SECTOR RECAPITALIZATION OF A FAILED FINANCIAL COMPANY (2013) 
[hereinafter 2013 TCH SPOE Report), available at https://www.theclearinghouse.org/~/med 
ia/Files/Association%20Documents/20130117%20Title%20II%20and%20Single%20Point%20 
of%20Entry%20White%20Paper.pdf.   
 50 2014 Wall Street SPOE Letter, supra note 49, at 25 & n.90 (summarizing Mr. Volcker’s 
argument); see also Joe Adler, Is the FDIC’s ‘Single-Point’ Resolution Plan a Stealth 
Bailout?, AM. BANKER, Dec. 13, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 31174108 (quoting Mr. 
Volcker’s opinion that SPOE “ ‘doesn’t sound like a liquidation’ ”).   
 51 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 50 (quoting my statement that “[SPOE] doesn’t look like a 
liquidation.  It looks like a . . . reorganization in which the systemically important financial 
institution survives to fight another day.”); Who Is Too Big to Fail: Does Title II of the Dodd-
Frank Act Enshrine Taxpayer-Funded Bailouts?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of David A. 
Skeel, Jr.), http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba09-wstate-dskeeel-201 
30515.pdf (“[A]lthough Title II explicitly requires that its provisions be used for liquidation, 
[single point of entry] is essentially a reorganization.  It thus stands in tension with the 
explicit requirements of Title II.”). 
 52 2014 Wall Street SPOE Letter, supra note 49, at 26 (emphasis added).  The trade 
groups did not cite any provision of Title II that explicitly requires treatment for creditors 
similar to a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  The groups did, 
2015]      WALL STREET BAILOUTS  57 
 
 
the groups acknowledged, Title II only requires that creditors 
receive “at least as much value in satisfaction of their claims as 
they would have received in a liquidation under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”53  To bolster their argument for a 
reorganization strategy, the Wall Street groups asserted that 
dissolving a failed SIFI’s parent holding company would be 
sufficient to satisfy the liquidation-only mandate.54  They also 
contended that Title II does not require any restructuring of 
operating subsidiaries after they are transferred to a BFC.55  
Other Wall Street supporters maintained that Title II would allow 
a BFC and its operating subsidiaries to emerge intact as a “new 
financial holding company” following an SPOE resolution.56   
Thus, Wall Street’s SPOE plan contemplates little or no 
restructuring at the holding company level or the subsidiary level 
after the FDIC has transferred operating subsidiaries from a failed 
SIFI’s parent holding company to a BFC.  Wall Street obviously 
prefers a reorganization strategy that would convert a failed SIFI 
into a new, cleaned-up SIFI with a minimum of structural 
                                                                                                                   
however, assert that a “duty” to provide such treatment could be “implied” from Title II’s 
overall purpose to “avoid or mitigate” the potential for “serious adverse effects on financial 
stability in the United States.”  Id. at 26 n.97.   
 53 Id. at 26 (citing Dodd-Frank §§ 210(a)(7)(B), (d)(2)(B)). 
 54 Id. at 25. 
 55 Id. at 25, 27; see also Guynn, supra note 35, at 291 (“[T]he duty to liquidate only 
applies to the financial company that is actually put into a Title II receivership.  Under the 
SPOE strategy, only the parent would be put into such a receivership.”).   
 56 Guynn, supra note 35, at 295 (“In the final step, the old bridge company becomes a new 
financial holding company, fully in the private sector.”).  The Bipartisan Policy Center, a 
think tank that is widely viewed as a supporter of Wall Street, see infra note 62 and 
accompanying text, has advocated the same outcome.  JOHN F. BOVENZI ET AL., BIPARTISAN 
POLICY CTR., TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE PATH TO A SOLUTION: A REPORT OF THE FAILURE 
RESOLUTION TASK FORCE OF THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM INITIATIVE OF THE 
BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER 31 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 BPC SPOE Report], available at 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/too-big-fail-path-solution-525 (stating that, at the end of 
an SPOE resolution, “the bridge holding company would be converted into a normal state- 
or federally chartered corporation”); id. at 30 fig.7 (showing graphically how the BFC would 
be converted into a new financial holding company).  The principal authors of the 2013 BPC 
SPOE Report were John Bovenzi (partner in the Oliver Wyman financial consulting firm), 
Randall Guynn (head of Davis Polk’s financial institutions practice and originator of the 
“recapitalization-within-resolution” concept), see supra note 35, and Thomas Jackson (a 
leading bankruptcy law scholar).  2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra, at 82. 
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changes.57  The extent to which the FDIC agrees with Wall Street’s 
strategy remains unclear.58  The FDIC’s SPOE proposal stated, 
however, that SPOE resolutions would use some of the same 
claims procedures and accounting principles as are used in 
Chapter 11 reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Code.59  
                                                                                                                   
 57 Guynn, supra note 35, at 295–96; 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 56, at 30–31.  In 
her comment letter on the FDIC’s SPOE proposal, former FDIC Chair Sheila Bair warned 
that,  
without further progress under Title I [of Dodd-Frank] to require U.S. 
SIFIs to simplify and rationalize their legal structures, the most likely 
outcome of the SPOE approach will be to replace one systemic firm with 
another . . . . [T]his new firm . . . could still have the same name, many of 
the same employees, and pose the same external risks to the system.   
Adler, supra note 50, at 3 (quoting letter from Ms. Bair dated Feb. 18, 2014). 
  The financial industry has also advocated the enactment of a new “Chapter 14” of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which would authorize federal bankruptcy courts to use an SPOE approach 
for reorganizing insolvent financial holding companies.  As I have described elsewhere, the 
financial industry’s “Chapter 14” proposal contemplates even greater benefits for SIFIs and 
their executives and Wall Street creditors than those parties would receive in an SPOE 
resolution under Title II of Dodd-Frank.  See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial 
Industry's Bankruptcy Plan for Resolving Failed Megabanks Would Give Unwarranted 




 58 In his May 2012 speech, FDIC Chair Martin Gruenberg described SPOE as  
a resolution strategy under which the FDIC takes control of the failed 
[SIFI] at the parent holding company level and establishes a bridge holding 
company as an interim step in the conversion of the failed [SIFI] into a new 
well-capitalized private sector entity.  We believe this strategy holds the 
best possibility of . . . producing a new, viable private sector company out of 
the process. 
Gruenberg, supra note 13.  Those remarks appear to be generally consistent with Wall 
Street’s reorganization strategy.  In another speech three years later, Mr. Gruenberg stated 
that “the resolution process [under SPOE] would end with the termination of the bridge 
financial company]” as well as “the wind-down of the [BFC] in a way that minimizes 
systemic disruption.”  Martin J. Gruenberg, Chair, FDIC, A Progress Report on the 
Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Address to the Peterson Instit. 
for Int’l Econ. (May 12, 2015), available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spmay 
1215.html.  Mr. Gruenberg’s 2015 speech could be viewed as departing to some extent from 
Wall Street’s reorganization strategy.   
 59 FDIC SPOE Proposal, supra note 43, at 76,618 (“[T]he FDIC intends to adapt certain 
claims forms and practices applicable to a Chapter 11 proceeding under the Bankruptcy 
code.”); see also id. at 76,619 (stating that the FDIC’s SPOE resolution process would follow 
the “fresh start model” for accounting treatment that is “generally applied to companies 
emerging from bankruptcy under Chapter 11”). 
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C.  WALL STREET’S SPOE STRATEGY WOULD ENSURE FUTURE 
BAILOUTS FOR WALL STREET CREDITORS AND IMPOSE LOSSES ON 
ORDINARY INVESTORS AND TAXPAYERS 
1. SPOE Would Protect Wall Street Creditors of Failed SIFIs.  
As shown in the preceding section, Wall Street’s SPOE plan would 
allow a failed SIFI to be reorganized rather than liquidated, and it 
would enable the SIFI’s successor holding company and former 
operating subsidiaries to emerge intact as a new SIFI.60  Wall 
Street’s version of SPOE would also maintain the operating 
subsidiaries during the resolution process and protect their 
creditors from any losses.61  In a May 2013 report, the Bipartisan 
Policy Center (BPC)—a think tank that receives significant 
funding from the financial industry and generally supports policies 
favorable to Wall Street62—highlighted those outcomes as key 
virtues of SPOE.63     
Wall Street’s SPOE strategy strongly resembles the expedited 
“Section 363” transactions that federal officials used to reorganize 
Chrysler and General Motors (GM) under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.64  In the Chrysler case—on which the 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Guynn, supra note 35, at 290–91, 295–96; 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 56, at 
26–28, 31–32. 
 61 Guynn, supra note 35, at 295–96; 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 56, at 27–28. 
 62 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, MADE IN THE SHADE: AN EXAMINATION OF WHETHER THE 
BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER IS TRULY NEUTRAL 6–7 (2013), available at http://www.citizen. 
org/documents/biparisan-policy-center-neutrality-report.pdf (reporting that the American 
Bankers Association and Citigroup were “major contributors” to BPC in 2012, and 
describing BPC’s financial regulatory task force as an “industry dominated panel” because 
most members had “clear ties to large banks”); Simon Johnson, The Dark Side of 
Bipartisanship, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG, Oct. 25, 2012, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.c 
om/2012/10/25/the-dark-side-of-bipartisanship/?_r=1 (“[T]he Bipartisan Policy Center seems 
likely to side with industry lobby groups on all substantive questions.”); see also BIPARTISAN 
POLICY CTR., 2014: ANNUAL REPORT 54–55 (2015), available at http://bipartisanpol 
icy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/BPC-2014-Annual-Report.pdf (listing the American 
Bankers Association, American Express, Bank of America, BlackRock, Citigroup, Credit 
Suisse, Fidelity Investments, Financial Services Forum, Financial Services Roundtable, 
Goldman Sachs, Institute of International Bankers, MetLife, PNC Financial, Prudential, 
The Clearing House, and Zurich Insurance Group among BPC’s corporate donors). 
 63 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 56, at 23–32, 63–70. 
 64 Id. at 31, 33–34; see also David A. Skeel Jr., Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy 
Alternative 15 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 14-10,  2014), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2408544 (observing that SPOE “bears a striking 
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subsequent GM deal was modeled—the federal government (1) 
created a shell company (similar to a BFC), (2) provided massive 
funding to finance the shell company’s purchase of substantially 
all of Chrysler’s assets, and (3) arranged for the shell company—
which became the “new” Chrysler—to assume responsibility for 
claims held by favored creditors (including trade creditors and 
beneficiaries under Chrysler’s pension and health care plans).  
Meanwhile, the claims of disfavored creditors (including secured 
bondholders, terminated dealers, and customers with product 
liability claims) were left behind in the bankruptcy estate of “old” 
Chrysler.65  As Mark Roe and David Skeel pointed out, the 
Chrysler reorganization was highly controversial, and “[t]he 
unevenness of the compensation to prior creditors raised 
considerable concerns in capital markets.”66    
Like the Chrysler transaction, Wall Street’s SPOE plan would 
disfavor long-term bondholders of a failed SIFI’s parent holding 
company while providing full protection to short-term creditors of 
the holding company and all creditors of its operating subsidiaries.  
The favored creditors would include uninsured depositors, holders 
of commercial paper, and counterparties under derivatives and 
securities repurchase agreements, many of whom are institutional 
investors with close connections to Wall Street.67   
                                                                                                                   
resemblance” to the federal government’s restructuring of Chrysler and General Motors); 
Stephen J. Lubben, OLA After Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?, in AN 
UNFINISHED MISSION: MAKING WALL STREET WORK FOR US 13, 13 (Mike Konczal & Marcus 
Stanley, Americans for Fin. Reform & the Roosevelt Institute eds., 2013), available at http:// 
rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Unfinished_Mission_2013.pdf (noting that 
SPOE uses “a process that is very much like that used in ‘363 sales’ under chapter 11, widely 
publicized by the automotive bankruptcy cases”).  
 65 Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 
729–34, 765 (2010); Skeel, supra note 64, at 15; see also Adam Levitin, Single-Point-of-Entry: 
No Bank Left Behind, CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 31, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/cred 
itslips/2014/08/single-point-of-entry-no-bank-left-behind.html  (explaining that, under SPOE, 
as with the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, “[t]he good assets and favored liabilities are 
transferred to a new, government-backed entity, while the disfavored liabilities remain with 
the old, liquidating entity”). 
 66 Roe & Skeel, supra note 65, at 770.  For a contrasting and more favorable assessment 
of the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies, see Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and 
Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009).  
 67 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 56, at 28, 31; see also Levitin, supra note 65 
(stating that under SPOE, “all of the derivative counterparties, all of the commercial paper 
2015]      WALL STREET BAILOUTS  61 
 
 
2.  Wall Street’s Funding Plan for SPOE Resolutions Would 
Impose Losses on Ordinary Investors and Taxpayers.  Wall Street’s 
SPOE strategy relies on a two-part funding plan that would 
protect Wall Street creditors at the expense of ordinary investors 
and taxpayers.  The first major funding source would be long-term 
bail-in bonds issued by parent holding companies of SIFIs.  When 
a SIFI fails, the bail-in debt would be converted into equity to 
capitalize the newly-formed BFC, to support the SIFI’s operating 
subsidiaries, and to protect the creditors of those subsidiaries from 
any losses.68   
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) recently proposed that 
global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) should be required 
to issue long-term debt to provide “total loss-absorbing capacity” 
(TLAC) for their resolution if they fail.69  The FSB’s TLAC 
proposal would compel G-SIBs (the largest global SIFIs) to issue 
long-term, unsecured debt that could be either written off or 
converted into equity.  The proceeds from write-downs and 
conversions of bail-in debt would be used to protect depositors and 
other favored short-term creditors, including counterparties under 
derivatives and securities repurchase agreements.70  A former 
                                                                                                                   
creditors, all of the repo counterparties, and all of the securities lending counterparties get 
bailed out”). 
 68 Guynn, supra note 35, at 289–90, 292, 295–96; 2013 BPC SPOE Report, supra note 56, at 
26–28, 31–32; 2013 TCH SPOE Report, supra note 49, at 6–7, 24–26; see also Charles 
Goodhart & Emilios Avgouleas, A Critical Evaluation of Bail-ins as Bank Recapitalisation 
Mechanisms 3–5, 7–9 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy, Research Discussion Paper 10065, 2014), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2478647 (describing the “bail-in” debt strategy advocated by SPOE 
supporters); Michael Krimminger, Shadows and Mirrors: The Role of Debt in the Developing 
Resolution Strategies in the U.S., U.K., and European Union 10–14, 20 (Dec. 30, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2560982 (outlining the “bail-
in” debt strategy). 
 69 Adequacy of Loss-Absorbing Capacity of Global Systemically Important Banks in 
Resolution: Consultative Document, FIN. STABILITY BD. (Nov. 10, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 
FSB TLAC Proposal], http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/TLAC-Con 
doc-6-Nov-2014-FINAL.pdf; see also Krimminger, supra note 68, at 20–25 (describing the 
FSB’s TLAC proposal); 2014 Update of List of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-
SIBs), FIN. STABILITY BD. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2014/11/20 
14-update-of-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks (designating 30 G-SIBs, including 
eight G-SIBs headquartered in the U.S.).  
 70 See Krimminger, supra note 68, at 20–25 (discussing the use of bail-in debt to satisfy 
the FSB’s proposed TLAC requirement); see also 2014 FSB TLAC Proposal, supra note 69, 
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FDIC General Counsel remarked that the FSB’s “TLAC proposal 
was developed in the context of [the SPOE] strategy” and was 
“designed to maintain systemically important operations in 
subsidiaries” of failed G-SIBs.71  
The FSB’s TLAC proposal would force global SIFIs to issue 
hundreds of billions of dollars of bail-in debt.72  SIFIs would face 
significant challenges in finding buyers for that debt.  Regulators 
agree that SIFIs should not sell bail-in bonds to other SIFIs 
because cross-holdings of bail-in debt among large financial 
institutions would increase the risks of contagion during a crisis.73   
SIFIs could potentially sell bail-in debt to hedge funds and 
private equity funds.  Many of those funds, however, borrow large 
amounts from SIFIs.  Consequently, regulators might not be able 
to impose bail-in debt losses on hedge funds or private equity 
funds during a crisis due to concerns about their ability to repay 
their loans to SIFIs.74   
                                                                                                                   
at 6–8, 13–20 (explaining the TLAC proposal).  The FSB issued its final international TLAC 
standard in November 2015, after the manuscript for this article had been completed.  See 
Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., FSB Issues Final Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity Standard 
for Global Systemically Important Banks (Nov. 9, 2015), available at http://www.financialst 
abilityboard.org/2015/11/tlac-press-release/. 
 71 Krimminger, supra note 68, at 23; see also id. at 1 n.1, 23 (noting that the author, a 
former FDIC General Counsel, “participated in the original discussions leading to the 
suggestion of the SPOE approach”). 
 72 See John Glover, Bank Holding Company Bonds Fray as Traders Fret Over Risk, 
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 27, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-27/bank-holdi 
ng-company-bonds-fray-as-traders-fret-over-risk (reporting that G-SIBs already held “about 
$650 billion of loss-absorbing bonds” but “[t]hat amount may have to almost double to meet 
FSB requirements”); Ben Moshinsky, FSB’s Too-Big-to-Fail Bank Fix Seen Dragging on 
Economy, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 2, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-03/fb 
s-s-too-big-to-fail-fix-seen-dragging-on-economy (citing a Standard & Poor’s estimate that 
the 30 G-SIBs designated by FSB would need to issue about $500 billion of additional 
TLAC-eligible debt to meet the FSB’s proposed requirement).  
 73 Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Bank of Eng., Resolution and the Future of Finance, 
Speech at the INSOL International World Congress (May 20, 2013), available at http://www. 
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/speech658.pdf; see also 2014 FSB 
TLAC Proposal, supra note 69, at 12 (“To reduce the potential for a G-SIB resolution to spread 
contagion into the global banking system, it will be important to strongly disincentivise 
internationally active banks from holding TLAC issued by G-SIBs.”).  
 74 Avinash Persaud, Bail-ins Are No Better Than Fool’s Gold, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/686dfaa4-27a7-11e3-8feb-00144feab7de.html. 
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Regulators are therefore likely to encourage SIFIs to sell bail-in 
debt to non-systemic investors, including pension funds and 
mutual funds.75  Major banks have already sold about $300 billion 
of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos).76  CoCos are bail-in bonds 
that automatically convert to equity upon the occurrence of one or 
more designated events (such as the issuer’s insolvency).77  Banks 
have successfully marketed CoCos to asset managers because of a 
“hunt for yield” in a global debt market characterized by “ultra-low 
interest rates.”78   
Analysts have expressed growing concerns about the complexity 
of CoCos and other bail-in bonds as well as the difficulty of 
estimating losses that investors might suffer from bond write-
downs or conversions into equity.79  In 2014 the U.K.’s Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) barred U.K. banks from selling CoCos 
directly to retail investors due to their “complex” and “highly 
                                                                                                                   
 75 Id.; John Glover, Nicholas Comfort & Ben Moshinsky, Bank-Debt Buyers Won’t Sleep 
Easily at Night on Write-Down Bonds, 104 BLOOMBERG BNA BANKING REP. 337 (2015); see 
also Leonid Bershidsky, Hunt for Exotic Yields Is Dangerous, BLOOMBERG VIEW, Apr. 24, 
2014, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-24/hunt-for-exotic-yields-is-dangerous 
(“The CoCo idea is fashionable among regulators . . . .”). 
 76 Christopher Thompson, Chinese Banks Issue Most Coco Bonds, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2015, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5a99b804-b135-11e4-9331-00144feab7de.html#axzz3s2aMHHSL 
(“Banks have issued $288bn of cocos since the asset claim first appeared in 2009 . . . .”). 
 77 See generally Stefan Avdjiev, Anastasia Kartasheva & Bilyana Bogdanova, CoCos: A 
Primer, 2013 BIS Q. REV. 43, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326334 (providing an 
overview of CoCos).  
 78 James Shotter, Deutsche Sells 10-Year Debt with 2.75% Coupon, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2015, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a1af5768-b076-11e4-9b8e-00144feab7de.html; see also Christopher  
Thompson, Bank Debt Issuance Doubles to Record Levels, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2015, http://www. 
ft.com/intl/cms/S/0/e64de99a-9ffd-11e4-aa89-00144feab7de.html (describing a strong demand for 
CoCos due to a “voracious investor appetite for yield”); Bershidsky, supra note 75 (“Asset 
managers have bought more than 60 percent of seven recent issues [of CoCos] by big banks” in a 
market where investors were “[t]ortured by low interest rates . . . .”).  
 79 See Bershidsky, supra note 75 (“[I]nvestors may be underestimating the risks [of 
CoCos,]. . . the scale of which is hard to pin down.”); Glover, Comfort & Moshinsky, supra note 
75, at 337–38 (describing the uncertainty and risks inherent in bail-in bonds); Frances 
Schwartzkopff, Bank Bail-In Extras Alarm Investors as Danske Eyes Debt, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 
8, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-07-bank/bail-in-extras-alarm-invest 
ors-as-danske-explores-new-debt (discussing concerns with the complexity and risks of bail-in 
bonds). 
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risky” features.80  The FCA and other regulators, however, have 
allowed SIFIs to sell CoCos and other bail-in bonds to pension 
funds and mutual funds that serve retail investors (retail mutual 
funds), even though ordinary individuals would ultimately bear 
any losses on those bonds.81   
Selling bail-in debt to pension funds and retail mutual funds 
would simply shift some of the costs of resolving failed SIFIs from 
taxpayers to individual savers while protecting favored Wall 
Street creditors.82  In his recent testimony before a House of Lords 
subcommittee, HSBC chairman Douglas Flint argued that society 
must bear the costs of resolving failed SIFIs, and he noted that 
bail-in debt provides a method for “distributing the burden of 
failure” from taxpayers to pensioners and retail investors.83  Mr. 
Flint asserted, “At the end of the day, the burden of failure rests 
with society.  Whether you take it out of society’s future income 
through taxation or whether you take it out through their pensions 
or savings, society is bearing the cost.”84  
Mr. Flint’s remarkable statement exposes the assumption of 
megabank insiders that society—including taxpayers, pensioners, 
and retail investors—must pay for the costs of resolving failed 
                                                                                                                   
 80 Jenny Anderson, British Watchdog Curbs High-Yield Bonds Called CoCos for Small 
Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/british-watchd 
og-curbs-high-yield-bonds-called-cocos-for-small-investors (quoting Christopher Woolard, 
the FCA’s director of policy, risk and research). 
 81 See Jeremy C. Jennings-Mares, CoCo No-Go for Ordinary Joe, MORRISON & FOERSTER 2 
(Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2014/08/140811CoCoNoGofor 
OrdinaryJoe.pdf (explaining that the FCA’s ban on sales of CoCos to ordinary retail investors 
would not prohibit sales of CoCos to pension funds and “regulated collective investment 
scheme[s]” in which ordinary individuals hold “beneficial interests”); see also Bershidsky, 
supra note 75 (contending that regulators are likely to place retail investors at risk by 
allowing asset managers to buy CoCos).  
 82 See Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 68, at 24 (“[S]hifting from bail-out to bail-in 
will . . . primarily transfer the burden of loss from one set of domestic players, the tax-
payers, to another, the pensioners and savers.”). 
 83 U.K. House of Lords, Review of the EU Financial Regulatory Framework Before Sub-
Comm. A (Econ. & Fin. Affairs) of the Select Comm. on the Eur. Union of the U.K. House of 
Lords (Oct. 21, 2014) (testimony of Douglas Flint) [hereinafter 2014 Flint Testimony], 
available at http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocu 
ment/eu-sub-a-economic-and-financial-affairs-committee/review-of-the-eu-financial-regulat 
ory-framework/oral/14795.html.   
 84 Id. (emphasis added). 
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SIFIs.85  He did not mention the possibility that SIFIs or their 
insiders might bear any responsibility for excessive risk-taking.  
Mr. Flint’s assertion reflects the prevailing attitude on Wall Street 
and in the City of London before, during, and after the financial 
crisis: SIFIs and their insiders should retain their profits and 
bonuses from high-risk activities while governments and ordinary 
citizens must bear the losses.86    
As a matter of social equity, “pushing pensioners [and retail 
investors] under the bus” to save SIFIs and their Wall Street 
creditors is no more palatable than relying on taxpayers to finance 
bailouts.87  Pensioners and retail investors do not have a superior 
ability, compared with taxpayers, to evaluate the risks of SIFIs or 
to bear the financial burden of bailing out SIFIs and their favored 
creditors.88  Accordingly, regulators should prohibit SIFIs from 
selling bail-in bonds to ordinary individuals, retail mutual funds, 
and pension funds unless those bonds are explicitly  marketed and 
sold as “subordinated debt” that is junior to the claims of all 
general creditors.  SIFIs should be barred from selling bonds to 
such investors that are designated as “senior” to subordinated debt 
but contain high-risk, bail-in features.  SIFIs are already 
concocting such instruments for the purpose of selling bail-in debt 
with lower interest rates than subordinated debt.89 
                                                                                                                   
 85 See James Titcomb, Mark Carney: No More Bank Bail-Outs, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 10, 
2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11220192/Mark-Car 
ney-No-more-bank-bail-outs.html (“Douglas Flint, the chairman of HSBC, has said that bail-in 
rules will still mean the public being on the hook for banks.”). 
 86 SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE 
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 12 (2010) (“The basic, massive subsidy scheme [for SIFIs] 
remains unchanged: when times are good, the banks keep the upside as executive and 
trader compensation; when times are bad and potential crisis looms, the government picks 
up the bill.”); see also Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1394–97 (explaining how major 
U.K. banks pushed for deregulation and “light touch” supervision, which ultimately led to a 
massive crisis in which “U.K. authorities were forced to bail out four of the nine largest 
U.K. banks”).  See generally JOHNSON & KWAK, supra, at 10–12, 133–34, 150–74, 178–82 
(describing the prevailing views on Wall Street before and during the financial crisis). 
 87 Persaud, supra note 74; accord Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 68, at 24.   
 88 Bershidsky, supra note 75; Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 68, at 24–25; Persaud, 
supra note 74.  
 89 Christopher Thompson, Banks Engineer Lower-Cost Risk Capital, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2, 
2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7256ad46-aae4-11e4-81bc-00144feab7de.html#axzz3s2 
66 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 50:43 
 
 
Prohibiting SIFIs from selling bail-in bonds, except for 
subordinated debt, to ordinary investors would (1) greatly reduce 
the risk of misleading those investors about the risks of bail-in 
bonds and (2) require SIFIs to pay higher interest rates that would 
more fairly compensate ordinary investors for the extraordinary 
risks inherent in bail-in debt.  SIFIs should sell more complex bail-
in bonds only to sophisticated, wealthy individuals and to 
institutional investors who do not manage funds for ordinary 
individuals.  The foregoing restrictions might persuade SIFIs to 
issue greater amounts of common stock and non-cumulative 
perpetual preferred stock in order to satisfy the FSB’s proposed 
TLAC requirement.90  That would be a highly desirable outcome.  
Shareholders’ equity provides the most stable and durable source 
of funding for financial institutions because shareholders cannot 
force a SIFI to redeem their investments and cannot declare a 
default if a SIFI is forced to suspend dividends to conserve its 
capital.91 
Wall Street’s SPOE plan relies on the Orderly Liquidation Fund 
(OLF) as its second major funding source and ultimate backstop.  
If the assets and bail-in bonds of a failed SIFI’s holding company 
are not sufficient to capitalize the BFC and to cover the losses of 
its operating subsidiaries, the FDIC would use the OLF to fill the 
gap.92  Dodd-Frank does not establish a prefunding mechanism for 
the OLF, and the OLF therefore has a zero balance.93  The FDIC, 
however, can obtain immediate funding from the OLF by 
                                                                                                                   
a MHHSL (reporting that SIFIs “are looking for clever ways to lower the cost” of bail-in debt 
by creating new types of bonds that “would incur losses in the event of a bank default but 
pay out less in interest to creditors than dearer, existing subordinated bonds”). 
 90 See Glover, Comfort & Moshinsky, supra note 75 (describing the challenges faced by 
megabanks in finding enough investors to purchase the bail-in bonds the banks must sell to 
satisfy the FSB’s proposed TLAC requirement).  
 91 See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 22, at 223–24 (describing common stock and 
non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock).  For a comprehensive analysis demonstrating that 
regulators should require megabanks to operate with much lower levels of leverage and to 
fund their operations with much higher levels of equity capital, see generally ANAT ADMATI & 
MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKER’S NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT (2013). 
 92 See Dodd-Frank, Pub. No. 111-203, § 210(n), 124 Stat. 1376, 1506 (2010) (establishing 
the OLF to finance liquidations of failed SIFIs under the OLA). 
 93 See infra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
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borrowing from Treasury a total amount of up to 10% of a failed 
SIFI’s assets during the first thirty days after the FDIC has been 
appointed as receiver, plus 90% of the “fair value” of the failed 
SIFI’s assets that become available to repay the OLF loan after the 
first thirty days.94   
The FDIC’s ability to borrow from Treasury provides “huge 
amounts of funding” to protect favored creditors of SIFIs and their 
operating subsidiaries.95  The fair value standard gives the FDIC 
considerable leeway in determining how much it can borrow from 
Treasury because it does not require the FDIC to use current 
market prices in valuing a failed SIFI’s assets.96  Moreover, as 
David Skeel has pointed out, Treasury loans for OLA resolutions 
will have “generous” terms, including interest rates that “will 
almost certainly be less than the penalty rate of interest called for 
in traditional lender-of-last-resort lending.”97   
The FDIC must ordinarily repay an OLF loan from Treasury 
within five years.98  If the proceeds from resolving a failed SIFI are 
insufficient to repay the loan, the FDIC must impose retroactive 
assessments on large financial institutions to recover the 
difference.99  Treasury may, however, extend the FDIC’s 
repayment period indefinitely if such action is necessary “to avoid 
a serious adverse effect on the financial system of the United 
States.”100  During a future systemic crisis, it is likely that the 
                                                                                                                   
 94 Dodd-Frank § 210(n)(5), (6).  In order to borrow funds from Treasury to finance a 
resolution of a failed SIFI, the FDIC must enter into a repayment agreement with Treasury 
after consulting with the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and 
the House Committee on Financial Services.  Id. § 210(n)(9).  
 95 Skeel, supra note 64, at 14, 17. 
 96 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 999.  
 97 Skeel, supra note 64, at 14 (explaining that § 210(n)(5)(C) of Dodd-Frank authorizes 
Treasury to charge interest rates on OLF loans based on “the average interest rates for a 
basket of corporate bonds” of comparable maturity); see also Examining How the Dodd-Frank 
Act Could Result in More Taxpayer-Funded Bailouts: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 113th Cong. 72, 82 (2013) (statement of Richard W. Fisher, President and Chief Exec. 
Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dallas), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hh 
rg81769/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg81769.pdf (“Call it whatever you wish, but this is taxpayer 
funding [for SPOE resolutions] at far-below-market rates.”). 
 98 Dodd-Frank §§ 210(n)(9)(B), (o)(1)(B). 
 99 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1015. 
 100 Dodd-Frank §§ 210(n)(9)(B), 210(o)(1)(B), (C). 
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FDIC would request, and Treasury would approve, a prolonged 
extension of the OLF repayment schedule, thereby postponing the 
FDIC’s duty to impose assessments on surviving SIFIs.  During 
such a crisis—as was certainly true in 2008—many SIFIs would 
not be strong enough to bear the additional burden of paying large 
assessments, as they would be exposed to many of the same risks 
that caused their peers to fail.  Accordingly, OLF loans for SPOE 
resolutions would frequently be extended far beyond the standard 
five-year term and would represent lengthy, taxpayer-funded 
bridge loans for the benefit of protected SIFI creditors.101 
Thus, Wall Street’s SPOE plan would provide “a stealth bailout” 
for favored creditors of failed SIFIs and their operating 
subsidiaries because bail-in bondholders (i.e., ordinary investors) 
and OLF loans (i.e., taxpayers) would bear the burden of 
protecting those creditors.102  Many favored creditors of failed 
SIFIs and their operating subsidiaries would be institutional 
investors with close connections to Wall Street, including holders 
of uninsured deposits, commercial paper, securities repurchase 
agreements, and other shadow banking liabilities.103  As Adam 
Levitin has observed, SPOE “ensures that Wall Street [creditors] 
will be rescued if a SIFI goes down.”104   
When the FDIC released its SPOE proposal, FDIC Vice Chair 
Thomas Hoenig warned that OLF funding would give SIFIs a 
significant cost of funding advantage, especially during future 
financial disruptions: 
In times of financial stress, the knowledge that 
operating units [of failed SIFIs] will be provided 
funding to meet liquidity demands could serve to 
                                                                                                                   
 101 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1020–21. 
 102 Lubben, supra note 64, at 16. 
 103 See Guynn, supra note 35, at 295–96 (describing how SPOE would provide preferential 
treatment for holders of short-term unsecured debt over long-term  debtholders); 2013 BPC 
SPOE Report, supra note 56, at 27–28, 31, 66, 68–69 (same); infra notes 139–55 and 
accompanying text (describing the heavy reliance of SIFIs on short-term debt funding 
provided by Wall Street investors, including uninsured depositors and holders of 
commercial paper, securities repurchase agreements, and other shadow banking liabilities). 
 104 Levitin, supra note 65. 
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encourage corporate treasurers and others to place 
their funds with SIFIs’ operating subsidiaries over 
other financial firms for whom such assurances are 
unavailable.  Therefore, this assumption and access to 
funding provides SIFIs a significant competitive 
advantage.105  
FDIC Board Member Jeremiah Norton similarly cautioned that 
SPOE could cause “the market equilibrium [to] shift in favor of 
[SIFI] subsidiaries” because “creditors of these subsidiaries could 
perceive that they would not take a loss upon distress at [a SIFI] 
and therefore would require a lower return on transactions or 
investments.”106  Thus, Mr. Hoenig and Mr. Norton recognized that 
SPOE could perpetuate the TBTF subsidy for SIFIs and their Wall 
Street creditors.107 
D.  SPOE’S CLAIMED BENEFITS ARE HIGHLY DOUBTFUL AND DO NOT 
JUSTIFY BLANKET PROTECTION FOR WALL STREET CREDITORS OF 
FAILED SIFIS  
Advocates for SPOE assert that the strategy has two significant 
advantages.  First, SPOE could avoid disruptions in financial 
markets by preserving a failed SIFI’s operating subsidiaries as 
going concerns.108  Second, SPOE could reduce cross-border 
conflicts between home country and host country regulators when 
a global SIFI fails.109  SPOE would allow the home country 
supervisor to maintain control of the parent holding company’s 
receivership, and the operating subsidiaries could be kept out of 
foreign insolvency proceedings.110  SPOE’s assumed benefits have 
                                                                                                                   
 105 Joe Adler, Likely Battle Ahead for FDIC’s ‘Single Point’ Resolution Plan, AM. BANKER, 
Dec. 11, 2013, 2013 WLNR 30941803 (quoting comments by Mr. Hoenig). 
 106 Jeremiah D. Norton, Board Member, FDIC, Discussion on the Current State 
Resolution Planning, Remarks to the American Bankers Association (Oct. 21, 2013), 
available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2013/spoct2113.pdf. 
 107 Adler, supra note 105. 
 108 See supra notes 39–40, 46 and accompany text. 
 109 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 110 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
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caused many U.S. and foreign regulators to express support for the 
strategy.111 
It is very doubtful, however, whether SPOE’s claimed 
advantages would actually be realized when a SIFI fails.  As to the 
first alleged benefit, the commencement of an OLA receivership for 
a failed SIFI’s parent holding company would likely have serious 
and potentially fatal spillover effects on its operating subsidiaries.  
Counterparties of subsidiaries might well decide to cut off credit 
lines and cancel other contracts instead of waiting to see whether 
the subsidiaries could survive as going concerns.112  For example, 
after Drexel Burnham Lambert’s holding company declared 
bankruptcy in 1990, Drexel’s two broker-dealer subsidiaries could 
not obtain even short-term credit from banks or other lenders, and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission was forced to place both 
broker-dealers in receivership.113  SPOE’s ability to maintain a 
failed SIFI’s subsidiaries as going concerns is therefore open to 
serious question, especially during a systemic financial crisis. 
There is also great uncertainty about SPOE’s ability to promote 
cross-border coordination when a global SIFI fails.  Despite 
intensive efforts by the G20 and the FSB, developed countries 
have not agreed on an international framework for resolving global 
SIFIs.  SPOE can work only with the cooperation of each host 
country in which a failed SIFI has a significant presence.  For 
example, each host country must allow the home country 
supervisor to control the resolution of the SIFI’s parent holding 
                                                                                                                   
 111 See supra notes 38–46, 69–71 and accompanying text (quoting statements of support 
for SPOE by FDIC and BoE officials and noting the FSB’s evident agreement with the 
concept); Guynn, supra note 35, at 284–86 (citing expressions of support for SPOE by U.S. 
and foreign regulators); 2014 Wall Street SPOE Letter, supra note 49, at 7–11 (“The FDIC’s 
SPOE Strategy under Title II of Dodd-Frank has been widely praised [by U.S. and foreign 
regulators] and developed significant momentum . . . .”). 
 112 Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 68, at 10–12, 34 (describing the potential negative 
effects of “the dismemberment of the parent holding company”). 
 113 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1607 (2007); see also id. at 1606–09 (providing additional examples of 
contagion from troubled financial holding companies to their subsidiaries). 
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company and must refrain from interfering with the SIFI’s 
operating subsidiaries.114   
At present, it is highly doubtful whether cross-border 
cooperation would be forthcoming if a global SIFI failed.  Only a 
few nations have adopted SIFI resolution laws comparable to Title 
II of Dodd-Frank.115  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
recently concluded that “as yet, orderly resolution of systemic 
cross-border banks is not a feasible option.”116  The IMF warned, 
“Should a large cross-border bank fail today, it appears unlikely 
that the pitfalls and misaligned incentives that undermined 
[international] cooperation in the global financial crisis could be 
avoided.”117  
Similarly, the FSB recently reported that “most jurisdictions do 
not currently have statutory powers to recognise, enforce or give 
legal effect to foreign resolution measures.”118  The FSB also 
cautioned that “very few jurisdictions currently have [cross-border 
resolution] frameworks in place,”119 and “no jurisdiction has 
experience” in applying such a framework to accomplish “the 
resolution of a complex, cross-border financial group.”120  In the 
absence of an effective international regime for resolving global 
SIFIs, host countries would likely use “ring-fencing” tactics to 
protect their citizens, including segregation and seizure of SIFI-
owned assets located in their jurisdictions.121   
                                                                                                                   
 114 Goodhart & Avgouleas, supra note 68, at 33–35, 40–44; Marc Jarsulic & Simon Johnson, 
How a Big-Bank Failure Could Unfold, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (May 23, 2013, 12:01 
AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/how-a-big-bank-failure-could-unfold/.  
 115 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-261, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORMS: 
U.S. AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ EFFORTS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT REFORMS, 29–34 
(2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662258.pdf. 
 116 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 4 (2014) [hereinafter IMF Bank Resolution Report] (bold type omitted), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/060214.pdf. 
 117 Id. at 23. 
 118 FIN. STABILITY BD., CROSS-BORDER RECOGNITION OF RESOLUTION ACTION: CONSULTATIVE 
DOCUMENT 3 (2014), available at http://www.financeialstabilityboard.org/publications/c_1409 
29.pdf. 
 119 Id. at 11. 
 120 Id. at 6.    
 121 IMF Bank Resolution Report, supra note 116, at 5–7 (“Unilateral responses [by national 
authorities] were the norm” in dealing with troubled cross-border SIFIs during the recent 
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Thus, SPOE’s claimed advantages are doubtful at best and do 
not justify giving blanket protection to Wall Street creditors of 
failed SIFIs at the expense of ordinary investors and taxpayers.  
As discussed in Part III below, policymakers must adopt reforms 
to mitigate the impact of SPOE’s shortcomings if SPOE is chosen 
as the preferred strategy for resolving failed SIFIs. 
III.  POLICYMAKERS SHOULD ADOPT TWO REFORMS TO REDUCE THE 
TBTF SUBSIDY EMBODIED IN WALL STREET’S SPOE PLAN 
U.S. and foreign regulators have expressed strong support for 
SPOE despite its flaws.122  In addition, regulators have not 
developed any alternative plan that could liquidate failed SIFIs 
during a systemic crisis without disrupting financial markets.123  
Nor has Congress acted on legislative proposals that would force 
megabanks to become smaller and less complex, thereby removing 
(or reducing) the TBTF threat they pose to the financial sector and 
                                                                                                                   
financial crisis, “leading in some cases to the breakup of [SIFI] groups into national 
components”); id. at 25–29 (noting that France, Belgium and the Netherlands could not agree 
on resolution plans for Dexia and Fortis and ultimately broke up both cross-border SIFIs into 
separate, nationalized banks); Paul Taylor, European Bank Mergers Still Face Hurdles Post-
Stress Tests, REUTERS, Oct. 12, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/12/us-ecb-banks-t 
ests-insight-idUSKCN0I105920141012 (describing “ring-fencing” strategies used by European 
bank regulators during the financial crisis and quoting former BoE Governor Mervyn King’s 
observation that “global banks are global in life but national in death”).   
 122 See supra notes 38–46, 69–71, 108–11 and accompanying text.  In November 2015, 
after the manuscript for this article had been completed, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) 
issued proposed rules that would require parent holding companies of U.S. G-SIBs and U.S. 
intermediate holding companies of foreign G-SIBs to maintain minimum levels of qualifying 
TLAC, including Tier 1 equity and long-term, bail-in debt.  As I have described elsewhere, 
the Fed's proposed TLAC rules would (1) entrench SPOE as the chosen strategy for 
resolving failed G-SIBs and (2) finance such resolutions by wiping out investments made by 
shareholders and bail-in debtholders of the parent holding companies, with OLF loans as 
the ultimate backstop.  The Fed’s proposed TLAC rules would ensure that operating 
subsidiaries of failed G-SIBs and their creditors would receive full protection, while most or 
all of the resolution costs would be borne by ordinary investors and taxpayers.  See Arthur 
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Fed’s TLAC Proposal Would Impose the Costs of Resolving Failed 
Megabanks on Ordinary Investors and Taxpayers, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (forthcoming Dec. 
2015).  
 123 Lubben, supra note 64, at 13–14; Skeel, supra note 64, at 2–3, 9–10. 
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the economy.124  It therefore appears likely that regulators will 
adopt SPOE as their preferred approach for resolving failed SIFIs. 
If SPOE becomes the primary roadmap for OLA resolutions, 
policymakers must adopt two reforms that would force SIFIs and 
their insiders to internalize at least some of the costs of the 
systemic risks they create.  First, SIFIs should pay risk-adjusted 
premiums to prefund the OLF.  Those premiums should include 
fees on uninsured deposits and short-term shadow banking 
liabilities held by SIFIs.  Second, SIFIs should pay at least half of 
their total compensation to senior executives and other key 
employees in the form of CoCos.   
A.  SIFIS SHOULD PAY RISK-ADJUSTED PREMIUMS TO PREFUND OLF 
1. Prefunding OLF Would Reduce the TBTF Subsidy for SIFIs.  
I and other scholars have argued that Congress should require 
SIFIs to pay risk-adjusted premiums to prefund the OLF.125  This 
reform is urgently needed to correct a serious flaw in Dodd-Frank.  
                                                                                                                   
 124 In 2010 the Senate rejected the Brown-Kaufman amendment, which would have imposed 
maximum size limits on banks and thereby mandated a breakup of the six largest U.S. banks.  
Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1055 n.454.  Congress has also failed to adopt either 
(1) a Senate bill introduced in July 2013, which would reestablish the Glass-Steagall Act’s 
mandatory separation between commercial banks and securities firms, or (2) another Senate 
bill introduced in April 2013, which would require SIFIs to hold much higher levels of equity 
capital and to stop using deposits from their FDIC-insured banks to subsidize the activities of 
their nonbank affiliates.  See Peter Eavis, Senators Introduce Bill to Separate Trading 
Activities from Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/ 
senators-introduce-bill-to-separate-trading-activities-from-big-banks/ (discussing the “21st 
Century Glass-Steagall Act” introduced by Senators Maria Cantwell, Angus King, John 
McCain, and Elizabeth Warren); Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1440–44 (discussing 
the bill introduced by Senators Sherrod Brown and David Vitter in April 2013).   
 125 See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Taxing Systemic Risk, in REGULATING WALL STREET: 
THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 121, 137–40 (Viral 
V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter REGULATING WALL STREET] (“[S]ystemically 
important financial institutions need to internalize the systemic risk costs they imposed on 
the financial system.”); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial 
Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 
YALE J. REG. 151, 154 (2011) (proposing a systemic risk insurance fund that would compel 
SIFIs to internalize the potential costs of their failure ); Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 
1, at 1015–23, 1049–50 (proposing that the FDIC should require SIFIs to pay risk-adjusted 
premiums to prefund the OLF); Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 358–63 
(presenting an updated proposal for prefunding the OLF). 
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As discussed above, Dodd-Frank established the OLF to provide 
funding for the FDIC’s liquidation of failed SIFIs, but Wall Street 
blocked legislative proposals that would have compelled SIFIs to 
pay premiums to prefund the OLF.126   
Consequently, the OLF has a zero balance, and the FDIC will 
be obliged to impose retroactive assessments on large financial 
institutions to cover unpaid balances on OLF loans after resolving 
failed SIFIs.  As previously shown, the FDIC would likely forebear 
from imposing assessments on surviving megabanks during a 
financial crisis.127  OLF borrowings would therefore remain unpaid 
until long after the crisis had passed.128    
Thus, taxpayers will almost certainly be forced to underwrite 
resolutions of failed SIFIs via long-term OLF loans.  The 
availability of OLF loans allows SIFIs to obtain short-term funding 
at artificially low, government-subsidized rates because short-term 
creditors of SIFIs expect to be fully protected during any future 
SPOE resolution.  A prefunded OLF would shrink this subsidy for 
SIFIs and their creditors.129 
I have proposed that banking firms with assets exceeding $100 
billion, together with nonbank financial companies designated as 
SIFIs under Dodd-Frank, should pay risk-adjusted premiums to 
prefund the OLF, over a period of several years, at a minimum 
level of $300 billion.130  That level is justified by the fact that 
Treasury provided $290 billion of capital assistance to the 
nineteen largest banks and AIG during the recent financial 
crisis.131  Each SIFI should pay risk-adjusted OLF premiums that 
reflect its contribution to systemic risk, based on factors such as 
size, complexity, opacity, leverage, liquidity, volatility of earnings, 
and interconnectedness with other large financial institutions.132   
                                                                                                                   
 126 See supra notes 6–8, 92–101 and accompanying text. 
 127 See supra notes 93–101. 
 128 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 129 See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text; Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra 
note 1, at 358–60 (“A prefunded OLF is essential to shrink the TBTF subsidy for [SIFIs].”). 
 130 Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 360. 
 131 Id.  
 132 See Acharya et al., supra note 125, at 124, 138 (describing a multi-factor approach for 
determining each SIFI’s contribution to aggregate systemic risk); Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, 
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Thus, OLF premiums should require each SIFI to “internalize” 
the systemic risk costs that it creates.133  The FDIC should use 
OLF premiums to cover losses from resolving a SIFI that remain 
unpaid after the FDIC has written off investments made by 
shareholders, holders of subordinated debt, and qualifying holders 
of bail-in bonds.  If the FDIC uses OLF premiums to cover such 
losses, the FDIC should impose additional risk-adjusted premiums 
on large financial institutions to replenish the OLF.134 
Requiring SIFIs to prefund the OLF would have several highly 
desirable outcomes.  First, a prefunded OLF would help to protect 
Treasury and taxpayers from bearing the costs of resolving failed 
SIFIs.  Second, a well-designed, risk-adjusted schedule for OLF 
premiums should encourage SIFIs to reduce their risks by 
following more prudent business strategies, maintaining stronger 
capital and liquidity positions, and adopting simpler, less complex 
business structures.  Third, SIFIs would have strong incentives to 
monitor other megabanks and alert regulators when they observe 
aggressive risk-taking by their peers.  Each SIFI would know that 
the failure of a peer institution would be likely to trigger 
additional OLF assessments.135  Fourth, a prefunded OLF would 
reduce the funding burden on prudent SIFIs by forcing high-risk 
megabanks to pay at least some OLF premiums before they fail.136  
Fifth, a prefunded OLF would encourage regulators to resolve 
failed SIFIs promptly.  A prefunded OLF would give the FDIC 
greater resources to resolve failed SIFIs without exposing 
taxpayers to the costs of OLF loans.  In contrast, the presently 
unfunded OLF encourages regulators to delay putting troubled 
SIFIs into OLA receiverships in order to postpone (and hopefully 
avoid) the unpopular step of using taxpayer-backed OLF loans to 
finance the resolutions.137  For all of the above reasons, a 
                                                                                                                   
supra note 1, at 1021–22 (proposing that the OLF premiums paid by each SIFI should be 
based on various factors related to systemic risk). 
 133 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1021–22.  For a proposed methodology for 
measuring and taxing systemic risk, see Acharya et al., supra note 125, at 124–31, 138–40. 
 134 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1019–20. 
 135 Id. at 1021. 
 136 Id.  
 137 Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 362. 
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prefunded OLF would reduce the TBTF subsidy that otherwise 
would grow even larger under Wall Street’s SPOE plan. 
2.  OLF Premiums Should Include Fees on Short-Term 
Liabilities Held by SIFIs.  If regulators embrace SPOE with its 
guaranteed protection for short-term creditors of SIFIs, they must 
require SIFIs to pay for that protection.138  Accordingly, each 
SIFI’s OLF premiums should include fees on its short-term 
liabilities.  Those fees should be comparable to risk-based deposit 
insurance premiums and should be assessed on uninsured deposits 
and other short-term liabilities held by SIFIs and their operating 
subsidiaries.      
SIFIs rely on cheap funding from government-subsidized, short-
term liabilities to finance their speculative activities in the capital 
markets.139  During the credit boom leading up to the financial 
crisis, megabanks expected that governments would protect all of 
their depositors (insured and uninsured) in order to preserve 
financial stability.  Regulators fulfilled that expectation by 
providing bailouts that rescued failing megabanks and protected 
all of their depositors.140  SIFIs continue to rely on low-cost 
deposits to finance their capital markets activities.141   
SIFIs also draw much of their short-term funding from shadow 
banking liabilities, including commercial paper, securities 
repurchase agreements (repos), and various types of asset-backed 
securities.142  Those instruments function as “shadow bank 
deposits” because they are “expected to be available on demand 
                                                                                                                   
 138 See Levitin, supra note 65 (“If there’s going to be a guarantee [for short-term liabilities 
of SIFIs under SPOE], it needs to be explicit and priced.”).  
 139 See Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 331–32 (explaining that Wall-
Street mounted a successful campaign to repeal the Lincoln Amendment to Dodd-Frank 
because SIFIs were determined to maintain their ability to conduct high-risk derivatives 
activities within their subsidiary banks so that they could “keep exploiting the cheap 
funding” provided by bank deposits). 
 140 Viral V. Acharya et al., A Bird’s Eye View: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, in REGULATING WALL STREET, supra note 125, at 1, 2–5.  See 
generally JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86; Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1. 
 141 See Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 350–52, 368–69 (describing the 
reliance of megabanks on low-cost deposits). 
 142 Pozsar et al., supra note 9, at 11–17, 22–32, 48–52. 
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and [paid] at par.”143  Shadow banking liabilities allow megabanks 
to obtain low-cost funding while avoiding deposit insurance 
premiums and, in some cases, higher capital requirements.144  
Indeed, repos have provided a cheaper source of funding than bank 
deposits during the past several years.145   
Investors in shadow banking liabilities include wealthy 
individuals, hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, 
corporations, municipalities, and other institutional investors.146  
Many of those investors have close connections to Wall Street 
megabanks.147  The financial crisis “demonstrated that shadow 
banking creates new channels of contagion and systemic risk 
transmission between traditional banks and the capital 
markets.”148  For example, about 90% of the assets of “prime” 
money market mutual funds (MMMFs) consist of short-term 
liabilities issued by financial institutions, including “commercial 
paper, structured securities, bank obligations, and repurchase 
agreements.”149 
During the financial crisis, markets for commercial paper and 
repos froze, and many MMMFs experienced runs by investors.150  
To prevent a collapse of the financial system, federal agencies 
established a wide array of emergency programs to protect shadow 
                                                                                                                   
 143 Id. at 52. 
 144 Id. at 11–14, 22–30. 
 145 Eric S. Rosengren, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, Broker-
Dealer Finance and Financial Stability, Keynote Remarks at the Conference on the Risks of 
Wholesale Funding, available at https://www.bostonfed.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2014/ 
081314/081314text.pdf (referring to Figure 10 in the accompanying presentation, which is 
available at http://www.bostonfed.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2014/081314figuresandcom 
ments.pdf); see also id. at 8–10 (referring to Figures 6 and 8, which show that securities 
broker-dealers, including subsidiaries of universal banks, raise about half of their funding 
through repos). 
 146 BLINDER, supra note 1, at 59–60; Poszar et al., supra note 9, at 46–54; see also Viral V. 
Acharya & T. Sabri Öncü, The Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Market, in REGULATING WALL 
STREET, supra note 125, at 319, 322 (listing major participants in the repo market).  
 147 Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, Shadow Banking Regulation, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. 
ECON. 99, 100 (2012) (“The operations of many shadow banking vehicles and activities are 
symbiotically intertwined with traditional banking and insurance institutions.”). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, How Safe Are Money Market Funds?, 2013 Q. J. 
ECON. 1081 (noting that “prime” MMMFs hold assets other than government securities). 
 150 Id. at 1083–90; Acharya & ncü, supra note 146, at 332–40.  
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banking creditors, including loans, guarantees, and asset 
purchases, which collectively provided a “360° backstop” for 
shadow banking liabilities.151  For example, Treasury guaranteed 
MMMF investors against further losses, the FDIC guaranteed new 
issuances of debt by financial holding companies, and the Federal 
Reserve System (Fed) purchased commercial paper and made 
loans to broker-dealers.152  Those federal programs pledged 
trillions of dollars to protect short-term creditors of large financial 
institutions, thereby serving as “modern-day equivalents of deposit 
insurance” for shadow banking liabilities.153 
HSBC chairman Douglas Flint recently acknowledged that 
universal banks received an “implicit subsidy” during the financial 
crisis “[b]ecause investment banking operations were alongside 
society’s deposits, [and] there was an implicit underwriting of all 
the debt within the operation because one would not risk the 
systemic panic that would happen if people thought their deposits 
were at risk . . . .”154  FDIC Vice Chair Thomas Hoenig has warned 
that universal banks continue to exploit the federal government’s 
“safety net subsidy” by combining commercial banking with capital 
markets activities and by relying on “wholesale funding markets” 
that are “major sources of volatility in times of financial stress.”155  
SPOE would perpetuate that subsidy by protecting short-term 
liabilities issued by SIFIs and their operating subsidiaries. 
As part of their OLF premiums, SIFIs should pay fees on their 
uninsured deposits and other short-term liabilities.  Those fees 
should be comparable to risk-based deposit insurance premiums 
and should reflect the credit, liquidity, and market risks inherent 
                                                                                                                   
 151 Pozsar et al., supra note 9, at 59–64.  
 152 Id. at 61–64; BLINDER, supra note 1, at 144–49, 161–62; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 
86, at 157–64. 
 153 Pozsar et al., supra note 9, at 64; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at 157–74 
(describing the emergency programs as “blank checks” for “bailing out Wall Street,” and noting 
that “the special inspector general for [the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)] estimated a 
total potential support package of $23.7 trillion, or over 150 percent of U.S. GDP”). 
 154 2014 Flint Testimony, supra note 83. 
 155 Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice Chair, FDIC, Can We End Financial Bailouts?, Address to the 
Boston Economic Club 7 (May 7, 2014), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/ 
spmay0714a.pdf. 
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in each SIFI’s short-term liabilities.156  The FDIC should monitor 
changes in short-term funding strategies used by SIFIs, and the 
FDIC should impose fees on new types of short-term liabilities that 
serve as substitutes for deposits, commercial paper, or repos.157   
Requiring SIFIs to pay fees on their short-term liabilities would 
help to shrink their TBTF subsidy.   Those fees would (1) force 
SIFIs to internalize risks created by those liabilities, (2) encourage 
SIFIs to adopt more stable, longer-term funding strategies that 
reduce their reliance on volatile, short-term liabilities, and (3) help 
to prefund OLF, thereby improving the FDIC’s ability to resolve 
failed SIFIs without relying on taxpayer-backed loans.158    
B.  SIFIS SHOULD PAY AT LEAST HALF OF THEIR COMPENSATION TO 
SENIOR EXECUTIVES AND OTHER KEY INSIDERS IN THE FORM OF 
COCOS 
1.  Universal Banks Provide Extraordinary Benefits to Insiders 
at the Expense of Taxpayers and Society.  As shown above, 
universal banks rely on subsidized, low-cost funding from deposits 
and shadow banking liabilities to finance their capital markets 
activities, including underwriting, market making, and trading in 
securities and derivatives.159  Most of the largest global banks 
have adopted the universal banking model as their favored 
                                                                                                                   
 156 See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 22, at 500–01 (describing the FDIC’s risk-
based deposit insurance premiums).  
 157 See Tracy Alloway, Meet the New Shadow Bank (It’s a Lot Like the Old Shadow Bank), 
BLOOMBERG, June 17, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-17/meet-the-
new-shadow-bank-it-s-a-lot-like-the-old-shadow-bank- (reporting that financial institutions 
were creating “a host of new vehicles” in order “to fill the hole left by . . . a shrinking repo 
market”). 
 158 See Acharya & Öncü, supra note 146, at 343–44 (discussing proposals to require 
issuers of repos to pay fees similar to deposit insurance premiums); Adrian & Ashcraft, 
supra note 147, at 130–32 (describing proposals to require issuers of MMMFs to pay 
assessments to create an “ex ante buffer” to protect their investors).   
 159 See supra Part III.A.2.  Megabanks receive additional benefits from the preferential 
treatment given to repos and derivatives under the Bankruptcy Code and statutes 
governing insolvencies of banks and SIFIs.  Large universal banks are the primary 
beneficiaries of that preferential treatment because they are leading issuers of repos and 
dominant dealers in derivatives.  For discussions of this topic, which is beyond the scope of 
this Article, see generally CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 22, at 506-07; Wilmarth, 
Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1361–62 and sources cited therein.  
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business strategy.160  The universal banking model creates a 
strong likelihood that serious problems occurring in one sector of 
the financial industry will spill over into other sectors and trigger 
a systemic crisis, as occurred during 2007–2009.  To stop the 
spread of contagion, governments provided trillions of dollars of 
assistance to protect depositors and shadow banking creditors of 
universal banks.161     
In addition to their huge systemic risks, universal banks have 
performed very poorly during the past decade, even after receiving 
massive benefits from their TBTF subsidy.162  As a prominent 
financial magazine recently stated, “It is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that global banks are . . . dysfunctional 
conglomerates.”163  A prominent columnist for a leading financial 
                                                                                                                   
 160 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at 208–09; see also Christine Harper, Breaking up Big 
Banks Hard to Do as Market Forces Fail, BLOOMBERG, June 27, 2012, http://www.bl 
oomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-27/breaking-up-big-banks-hard-to-do-as-market-forces-fail 
(explaining that large global banks have embraced the universal banking model); Kushal 
Balluck, Bank of Eng., Investment Banking: Linkages to the Real Economy and the Financial 
System, Q. BULL., 2015 Q1, at 1, 2, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/q 
uarterlybulletin/2015/ q1prerelease_2.pdf (“[M]ost [global banks] operate a universal banking 
model, providing other retail and corporate banking services—such as accepting deposits, 
making loans and facilitating payments—alongside their investment banking activities.”). 
 161 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at 120–21, 174; Balluck supra note 160, at 2, 9–11; 
Matthew Richardson, Roy C. Smith & Ingo Walter, Large Banks and the Volcker Rule, in 
REGULATING WALL STREET, supra note 125, at 181, 181–84, 190–96; Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, 
supra note 1, at 963–67, 977–87; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the 
U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased 
Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 451–76 (warning of the risks of universal banks several years 
before the financial crisis occurred). 
 162 E.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory 
Failures, 47 IND. L. REV. 69, 70–72, 132–37 (2014) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Citigroup]; 
Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 368–69, 369 n.518; Harper, supra note 160; 
Cocking up All Over the World, ECONOMIST, Mar. 7, 2015 [hereinafter Global Banks], http:// 
www.economist.com/node/21645731/; Oliver Ralph, Lex In-Depth: Universal Banks, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a21b7454-d243-11e4-ae91-00144feab7de. 
html#slide0; see also Michael J. Moore, Yalman Onaran & Nicholas Comfort, Biggest Global 
Banks Shrink Under Pressure from Regulators, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 27, 2015, http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-27/biggest-global-banks-go-to-pieces-under–pressu 
re-from-regulators (reporting that average returns on assets at ten of the largest global banks 
declined from 0.81% in 2006 to 0.22% in 2014). 
 163 Global Banks, supra note 162; see also The Fall of the Universal Bank, ECONOMIST, 
Nov. 21, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21566439/print (“The promise of the cross-
selling financial supermarket has long been eclipsed by the destruction of shareholder value 
after the crash.”). 
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newspaper similarly declared, “The universal banking model is 
broken . . . .”164 
Despite the woeful performance of global megabanks, their top 
executives are determined to preserve the universal banking 
model.165  Their attitude is not surprising, since large financial 
conglomerates have provided immense benefits to senior 
executives and other key employees (including traders).  
Compensation in the financial industry rose rapidly between 1980 
and 2006, as banks became larger and more complex, and in 2006 
financial sector compensation reached its highest level (compared 
with pay in other industries) since the early 1930s.166  Top 
executives of megabanks prospered even as their shareholders 
received lackluster or negative returns.167  Meanwhile, taxpayers 
                                                                                                                   
 164 Ralph, supra note 162. 
 165 Peter Coy, The Biggest Banks Aren’t Ready to Shrink, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 5, 2015, http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-05/bank-capital-rules-would-smaller-banks-really-
be-safer- (reporting that “most of the biggest global banks,” including JPMorgan Chase and 
Goldman Sachs, “are fighting to stay big and important”); Ben McLannahan, BofA Says It Is 
Not ‘Too Big to Manage,” FIN. TIMES, May 6, 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/12a73710-f 
410-11e4-bd16-00144feab7de.html#axzz3tUMKjvqi (quoting assertion by Bank of America 
Chair & CEO Brian Moynihan, that the bank’s “integrated model” produces “significant 
benefits” through “diversification of earnings streams, cost synergies and cheap funding”); 
Nathaniel Popper, JPMorgan Chase Insists It’s Worth More as One Than in Pieces, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/25/business/dealbook/jpmorgan-pushe 
s-back-against-suggestion-of-split.html?_r=0 (reporting on efforts by JPMorgan Chase Chair 
Jamie Dimon to preserve his bank’s “basic model of providing the full range of financial 
services around the globe”). 
 166 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at 58–61; Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages 
and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry: 1909–2006, at 3–4, 16–22, 30 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14644, 2009); Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra 
note 1, at 1406–07, 1420–21.  
 167 See Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 162, at 87–88, 114–17 (noting that Citigroup’s senior 
executives received very high compensation, including almost $1 billion paid to Sandy Weill, 
while Citigroup’s shareholders suffered huge losses between 2003 and 2012); Harper, supra 
note 160 (describing the disparity between high compensation paid to top executives at Bank 
of America and Citigroup and the banks’ underperforming stock prices, which were both 
trading below book value); Michael J. Moore, JPMorgan Worth One-Third More in Break-Up, 
Mayo Says, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 27, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-27/ 
jpmorgan-would-be-worth-more-if-split-up-mayo (quoting a research report by Michael Mayo, 
who observed that JPMorgan Chase’s stock price declined by 2% between 2004 and 2011, 
while the bank’s top five executives received “over $600 million of compensation”); Hugh Son & 
Pamela Roux, Jamie Dimon Is Now a Billionaire, and He Got There in an Unusual Way, 
BLOOMBERG, June 3, 2015, http://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2015-06-03/jamie-dimon-
becomes-billionaire-ushering-in-era-of-the-megabank-iagiwwl8 (reporting that Sandy Weill 
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and society incurred tremendous costs when financial markets 
froze and governments were forced to bail out SIFIs and their 
creditors during the financial crisis.168 
Perverse incentives in megabanks’ compensation plans help to 
explain the stark disparity between insiders’ extraordinary gains 
and outsiders’ huge losses.  SIFIs promised very large rewards to 
senior executives and other key insiders if they met short-term 
profit goals.169  Those rewards encouraged speculative bets that 
produced short-term earnings and bonuses for insiders but later 
inflicted gigantic losses on ordinary investors, the deposit 
insurance fund, taxpayers, and society.170  Compensation policies 
that encouraged excessive risk-taking were especially dangerous 
at megabanks, given their highly-leveraged capital structures and 
their reliance on explicit and implicit safety net subsidies.171  
Many analysts and regulators agree that executive compensation 
policies at SIFIs must be reformed to remove incentives for short-
term gambling.172 
                                                                                                                   
and Jamie Dimon both became billionaires while building universal banks at Citigroup and 
JPMorgan Chase).  
 168 See Wilmarth, Blind Eye, supra note 1, at 1312–17 (listing some of the enormous costs of 
the financial crisis); Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 257–67 (describing the 
federal government’s massive assistance to the largest financial institutions during the crisis).  
 169 BLINDER, supra note 1, at 81–84, 283–85, 297; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at 58–
61, 115–16; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 
247, 249–74 (2010); John McCormack & Judy Weiker, Rethinking “Strength of Incentives” 
for Executives of Financial Institutions, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2010, at 65, 66–69; 
Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk 
Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1216–23 (2011); Wilmarth, Citigroup, supra note 162, 
at 99, 104–05, 114–19. 
 170 See supra notes 166–69 and accompanying text (describing how bank compensation 
systems encouraged risk-taking, which eventually led to huge government bailouts).     
 171 Rosalind L. Bennett et al., Inside Debt, Bank Default Risk, and Performance During the 
Crisis 2–3 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2012-3, 2014), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2122619; McCormack & Weiker, supra note 169, at 66; Tung, supra note 
169, at 1210–16; Sjoerd van Bekkum, Inside Debt and Bank Risk, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3–4), available at http://ssrn.com/abs tract=1682139; 
Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 363 n.498. 
 172 See supra notes 169, 171, infra notes 173–77 and accompanying text (describing 
studies showing that equity-based compensation incentives encouraged disastrous short-
term risk-taking by insiders at large banks, while debt-based compensation plans motivated 
executives to adopt sustainable long-term business strategies that were less risky and 
better aligned with the interests of creditors). 
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2.  SIFIs Should Pay Much of Their Compensation to Insiders in 
the Form of CoCos.  To change the incentives for insiders at 
megabanks, regulators should compel SIFIs to adopt compensation 
policies that include smaller equity-based incentives and a much 
larger focus on long-term debt.  During the period leading up to 
the financial crisis, large banks assumed greater risks and 
suffered bigger losses if their executive compensation plans 
included strong equity-based incentives.173  Executives at those 
institutions made aggressive acquisitions, expanded 
nontraditional, fee-based businesses (including investment 
banking), and acquired large amounts of subprime mortgage-
backed securities.174  
In contrast, banks that issued larger amounts of long-term debt 
to their top executives performed significantly better during the 
financial crisis and had a substantially lower risk of default.175  
Long-term debt compensation for executives (inside debt) includes 
pension rights and deferred compensation rights, which are 
“typically unfunded and unsecured” and therefore “face default 
risk just as outside creditors do.”176  Executives holding a higher 
proportion of inside debt in relation to their equity interests had 
                                                                                                                   
 173 Jens Hagendorff & Francesco Vallascas, CEO Pay Incentives and Risk-Taking: Evidence 
from Bank Acquisitions, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1078, 1078–79 (2011); see also authorities cited infra 
in note 174. 
 174 Robert DeYoung et al., Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. 
Commercial Banks, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 165, 166–68, 175, 177, 180–83, 
189, 192–95 (2013); Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the 
Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11, 12–13, 24–25 (2011); Hagendorff & Vallascas, supra note 
173, at 1079–80, 1084–86, 1091–94; Bennett et al., supra note 171, at 1–6, 19–24, 36–37; see 
also Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Misaligned Bank Executive Incentive Compensation, 1–
6, 13–14, 17–33 (June 11, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2277917 (analyzing executive compensation plans at fourteen of the largest U.S. 
financial institutions between 2000 and 2008, and finding that (1) those fourteen 
institutions provided much larger amounts of equity-based pay to their chief executive 
officers, compared with thirty-seven smaller banks that did not receive TARP assistance; 
and (2) the same fourteen institutions incurred much greater risks and performed much 
worse during the financial crisis, compared with the group of thirty-seven smaller banks).  
 175 Bennett et al., supra note 171, at 3–6, 19–24, 34–37; Bekkum, supra note 171 
(manuscript at 4–7, 17–26, 30–31); Frederick Tung & Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt 
Compensation, and the Global Financial Crisis 3–5, 22–29 (B. U. Sch. of Law, Working 
Paper No. 11-49, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570161. 
 176 Tung & Wang, supra note 175, at 1, 6–7. 
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incentives that were more aligned with long-term creditors and 
therefore adopted lower-risk business strategies prior to the 
financial crisis.177  
The foregoing evidence supports the view that key insiders at 
SIFIs (including senior executives, traders and risk managers) 
should receive a large portion of their compensation in the form of 
long-term debt.  I have previously argued that SIFIs should pay at 
least half of the total compensation for key insiders in the form of 
CoCos.178  CoCos for key insiders should be converted into common 
stock upon the occurrence of a designated event of financial stress, 
including (1) a decline in capital below a specified level or (2) the 
initiation of an OLA receivership, a bankruptcy, or another 
insolvency proceeding for a SIFI or one of its principal operating 
subsidiaries.  The Fed, as the primary supervisor of the SIFI’s 
parent holding company, should have the authority to activate any 
pre-insolvency trigger for financial distress.     
Key insiders of SIFIs should be barred from making any 
voluntary conversions of their CoCos into common stock until 
three to five years after their employment ends.  In addition, after 
voluntary conversions occur, insiders should be required to spread 
their sales of common stock over an additional period of similar 
length.  Insiders should also be prohibited from using derivatives 
or other instruments to hedge their exposure to CoCos or common 
stock issuable upon conversion of CoCos.   
A lengthy post-employment holding period for CoCos and a 
further deferral period for sales of common stock issued upon 
voluntary conversions of CoCos would discourage insiders from 
making high-risk gambles to boost the value of their equity-based 
compensation or the voluntary conversion option for their CoCos.  
Insiders would know that their CoCos would be automatically 
converted into common stock upon the occurrence of a designated 
triggering event indicating financial distress.  Any common stock 
                                                                                                                   
 177 See Bennett et al., supra note 171, at 36. 
 178 See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text (discussing CoCos).  The following 
description of my proposal to require SIFIs to pay much of their executive compensation in 
the form of CoCos is adapted from Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1008–09, and 
Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 365–67.   
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received upon mandatory conversion would likely have little or no 
value.  Thus, CoCos would be a far more effective way of 
discouraging excessive risk-taking by insiders compared with 
complicated clawback provisions in employment contracts.179 
Requiring key insiders to receive at least half of their total 
compensation in the form of CoCos, and to hold those CoCos (and 
any resulting common stock) for several years after their 
employment, would give them powerful incentives to adopt 
business strategies that are consistent with the interests of long-
term creditors, the deposit insurance fund, the OLF, and 
taxpayers.  CoCos would ensure that (1) insiders would not receive 
a significant portion of their compensation unless their 
organization achieves long-term success, and (2) insiders would 
bear a fair share of the losses if their institution encounters severe 
financial distress during their employment or within several years 
thereafter.180   
Section 956(b) of Dodd-Frank requires federal regulators to 
issue rules barring incentive-based compensation plans that 
encourage “inappropriate” risk-taking by financial institutions.181  
Regulators have not yet adopted final rules to implement Section 
956(b), even though Dodd-Frank established a deadline of April 
2011 for that action.182  Regulators should promptly issue final 
rules that would carry out the intent of Section 956(b) by 
incorporating the CoCo compensation plan for SIFIs described 
above.183 
                                                                                                                   
 179 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1008–09; Wilmarth Two-Tier System, supra 
note 1, at 365–67.  For similar proposals to use CoCos to improve the incentives of key 
insiders of SIFIs, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance 
in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay 8–14 (Ctr. for Law & Econ. 
Studies, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 373, 2010), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1633906; Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation, 
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821, 1854–72 (2012). 
 180 Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1009. 
 181 Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 956(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1905 (2010). 
 182 Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 367 & n.517. 
 183 Id. at 367–68. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The high-risk business model of universal banks was an 
important cause of the financial crisis.  Universal banks rely on 
cheap funding from government-subsidized deposits and shadow 
banking liabilities to finance their speculative activities in the 
capital markets.  By combining deposit-taking and lending with 
underwriting, market making, and trading in securities and 
derivatives, the universal banking model creates a strong 
likelihood that problems occurring in one sector of the financial 
industry will spread to other sectors.  To prevent such contagion, 
federal regulators have powerful incentives to intervene during 
any serious disruption to protect universal banks and their 
depositors and short-term creditors.  The support expressed by 
regulators for Wall Street’s SPOE plan is a natural outgrowth of 
those incentives. 
Wall Street’s SPOE plan would guarantee future bailouts for 
Wall Street creditors while imposing losses from resolving failed 
SIFIs on ordinary investors and taxpayers.  Wall Street’s SPOE 
plan would also ensure that a failed SIFI would emerge from OLA 
with minimal structural changes.  Thus, Wall Street’s version of 
SPOE would preserve TBTF treatment for SIFIs and their Wall 
Street creditors.  In a future crisis, ordinary citizens would be 
expected once again—whether as investors in bail-in bonds or as 
taxpayers—to rescue Wall Street from its reckless gambling. 
Wall Street’s SPOE plan is part of its broader campaign to 
defend the universal banking model.  That business model has 
provided extraordinary benefits to insiders of SIFIs at the expense 
of ordinary investors, taxpayers, and society.  A straightforward 
policy response would be to break up SIFIs by imposing maximum 
size limits or by requiring functional separation similar to the 
Glass-Steagall Act.184  However, Congress has declined to adopt 
either approach.185   
                                                                                                                   
 184 See supra notes 5, 124 (describing proposals to impose maximum size limits on 
financial institutions and to enact a modern version of the Glass-Steagall Act). 
 185 See supra note 124 (discussing Congress’ failure to adopt either reform).  As an 
alternative remedy, I have proposed “narrow banking” reforms that would reduce 
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Despite SPOE’s serious flaws, U.S. and foreign regulators 
appear likely to adopt SPOE as their preferred strategy for 
resolving failed SIFIs.  If SPOE does become the preferred 
approach, policymakers should adopt two reforms to reduce 
SPOE’s subsidy for SIFIs and their insiders.  First, SIFIs should 
pay risk-adjusted premiums (including fees on their uninsured 
deposits and short-term shadow banking liabilities) to prefund the 
OLF.  Second, SIFIs should pay at least half of their total 
compensation for key insiders in the form of CoCos that are 
subject to lengthy post-employment holding periods.   
The foregoing reforms would not eliminate the TBTF subsidy 
for megabanks.  Those reforms, however, would compel SIFIs and 
their insiders to internalize at least some of the costs of the 
systemic risks they impose on society.  Requiring SIFIs and their 
insiders to absorb those costs would encourage them to follow more 
sustainable, long-term business policies, and would also support 
current efforts by regulators to persuade SIFIs to reduce their size 
and complexity.186 
 
                                                                                                                   
government subsidies for SIFIs and increase market pressures for voluntary breakups by 
(1) establishing strict legal firewalls between banking and nonbanking subsidiaries of 
SIFIs, and (2) prohibiting SIFIs from using deposits from their “narrow banks” to finance 
their nonbanking activities.  Wilmarth, Two-Tiered System, supra note 1, at 342–63.  
 186  See Moore, Onaran & Comfort, supra note 162 (reporting that U.S. and foreign regulators 
have imposed tougher capital rules, stress tests, liquidity requirements, and resolution 
planning standards to encourage megabanks to become smaller and less complex).  
       
